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Zeno's Paradox for Colours 
Imagine that we proceed along a line through the middle of a disk that is 
divided into two precisely symmetrical segments, one of which is red, the 
other green, and that we pass continuously from the red to the green 
segment. What happens as we pass the boundary between the two? Do 
we pass through a last point Pt that is red and a first point p2 that is green? 
Clearly not, given the density of every continuum; for then we should 
have to admit an indefinite number of further points between Pt and p2 
which would somehow have no colour. To acknowledge one of Pt and p2 
but not the other, however, as is dictated by the Dedekindian treatment 
of the continuum, would be to countenance a peculiar privileging of one 
of the two segments over the other, and an unmotivated asymmetry of 
this sort we can surely reject as a contravention of the principle of suffi-
cient reason. Perhaps, then, the line becomes colourless at the point where 
it crosses the segmentary divide, so that the red and green segments would 
be analogous, topologically, to open regions. One might seek support for 
this idea by reflecting that extensionless points are not in any case the 
sorts of things that can be coloured, since colour properly applies only to 
what is spatially extended. Imagine, however, a perfectly homogeneous 
red surface. Are the points and lines within the interior of this surface not 
then also red? 
To firm up our intuitions here let us consider two parallel thought-
experiments relating to motion and bodily contact. Since one seemingly 
exceptionally secure result of modern physics is that the four dimensions 
of space and time are continuous orders of a single type, we might safely 
assume that any solution to our colour problem should carry over to 
these other cases also. 
Imagine a body which is for a certain period at rest and then begins to 
move. Is there a last point in time Pt when the body is at rest and a first 
point p2 when it is in motion? Clearly not, given the density of every 
continuum; for then we should have to admit an indefinite number of 
further points between Pt and p2 at which the body would somehow be 
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neither at rest nor in motion. To acknowledge one of Pi and p2 but not 
the other, however, would again be to countenance a peculiar privileging 
of one or other temporal segment. Perhaps, then, the body is neither in 
motion nor at rest at the point in time where it crosses the segmentary 
divide. But is it even coherent to suppose that a body might be neither in 
motion nor at rest at a certain point in time? 
Imagine two perfect spheres at rest and in contact with each other. 
What happens at the point where they touch? Is there a last point Pi that 
belongs to the first sphere and a first point p2 that belongs to the second? 
Clearly not; for then we should have to admit an indefinite number of 
further points between Pi and p2 and this would imply that the two 
spheres were not in contact after all. To acknowledge one of Pi and p2 but 
not the other, however, would be to countenance what is here an asym-
metry of a quite peculiarly unmotivated sort. And our third alternative 
seems to be ruled out also. For to admit that the point where the two 
spheres touch belongs to neither of the two spheres seems to amount to 
the thesis that the two spheres do not touch after all. 
There is, however, an alternative (non-Dedekindian) account of what 
obtains as far as colour is concerned at the point on the line where the red 
and green segments meet, an account which can be smoothly extended 
also to the other cases mentioned. This affirms that there is but one (albeit 
complex) point of the line which lies precisely on the border between the 
two segments. This point is in a certain sense both red and green. More 
precisely, it is at one and the same time a ceasing to be red and a beginning 
to be green. More precisely still, it is a point where a red point and a green 
point coincide. Similarly in the case of the particle that begins to move: 
here too there is a single point in time at which the body is both at rest 
and moving (or more precisely: it is at one and the same time ceasing to 
be at rest and beginning to move). The terminal boundary of the initial 
interval coincides with the initial boundary of the subsequent interval. 
And the same account can be given also in relation to what occurs when 
two spheres touch: a point on the boundary of the one sphere coincides 
with a point on the boundary of the other. All bodies and all temporal 
intervals are on this account analogous, topologically, to closed regions 
(or perhaps we should more properly say that there is no analogue in the 
world of spatial and temporal continua of the standard opposition be-
tween open and closed). 
Asymmetrical Boundaries 
The picture of the world of continua and boundaries that is dictated by 
the above is as follows. Boundaries are full-fledged denizens of reality. 
They serve as objects of perception (and are perhaps the only objects of 
perception). But boundaries cannot exist in isolation: there are, in reality, 
no isolated points, lines or surfaces. Boundaries might be compared in 
this respect to forms or structures (for example the structure of a mole-
cule as this is realized in a given concrete case) in that they are located in 
space but do not take up space. Further, both boundaries and forms or 
structures (and holes, and shadows; perhaps also minds or souls) are 
comparable to universals in that, while they require of necessity hosts 
which instantiate them, they can in principle be instantiated by a variety 
of different hosts. (See Casati and Varzi (1994)) Consider, for example, 
that boundary which is the surface of an apple. The whole apple can here 
serve as host, but so also can the apple minus core, which might have been 
eaten away to varying degrees from within. 
As Brentano puts it: 
No boundary can exist without being connected with a continuum. 
... But there is no specifiable part, however small, of the continu-
um, and no point, however near it may be to the boundary, which 
is such that we may say that it is the existence of that part or of that 
point which conditions the boundary. (Brentano 1981, 56.) 
An adequate theory of the continuum must now recognize that bound-
aries may be boundaries only in certain directions and not in others. 
Imagine a line that is tangent to a circle and meets the circle at a certain 
point. The point on the line then coincides with a certain point on the 
circle. To see why the two points are not identical we might think of 
points (and boundaries in general) as being 'unsaturated' in something 
like Frege's sense, which is to say: they exist always in consort with 
certain additional entities of a predetermined sort, or in other words they 
are required to be completed in certain predetermined directions. Every 
point must serve as a boundary in at least one direction. 
Consider a point within the interior of a solid sphere. This is a bound-
ary in all possible spatial directions and is as it were a boundary of max-
imal fulness. An external boundary of a body, is of lesser fulness, since it 
bounds the bodily continuum in only some of the available directions. A 
boundary is from our present perspective determined in its nature by the 
continuum which it bounds. This implies, however, that 'the geometer's 
proposition that only one straight line is conceivable between two points, 
is strictly speaking false' (Brentano (1988), 12): Lines which enjoy as 
boundaries less than maximal fulness and which relate to different sides 
may coincide with one another. The boundary of an area that is red, for 
example, differs in kind from the boundary of an area that is blue: 'If a 
red surface and a blue surface are in contact with each other, then a red 
and a blue line coincide' (Brentano (1988), 41). Or again: 
Imagine the mid-point of a blue circular surface. This appears as the 
boundary of numberless straight and crooked blue lines and of 
arbitrarily many blue sectors in which the circular area can be 
thought of as having been divided. If, however, the surface is made 
up of four quadrants, of which the first is white, the second blue, 
the third red, the fourth yellow, then we see the mid-point of the 
circle split apart in a certain way into a fourness of points. (Bren-
tano (1988), 11) 
Points, therefore, may have parts and they coincide with these parts, as 
the parts, too, coincide among themselves. Each point of a two- or three-
dimensional continuum is in fact an infinite (and as it were maximally 
compressed) collection of distinct but coincident points: punctiform 
boundaries of lines, of two-dimensional segments of surfaces and of in-
terior regular and irregular cone-shaped portions within three-dimen-
sional continua, etc. Such ontological profligacy has its limits, however: 
the left punctiform boundary of a one-inch line is identical (and not 
merely coincident) with the left punctiform boundary of the correspond-
ing initial half-inch segment. 
Set Theory 
This non-Dedekindian zoology of boundaries and the continuum has its 
roots in the account sketched by Aristotle in the Physics, particularly as 
this has been interpreted by Franz Brentano and Roderick Chisholm. It 
proceeds as it were from the top down, taking as its starting point exten-
ded and qualitatively filled spatial continua as these are given in percep-
tion. Boundaries are then conceived as entities of a certain sort that are 
capable of being discriminated therein. Standard set-theoretic treatments, 
in contrast, work upwards, constructing models of the continuum from 
a starting point consisting of extensionless atoms (or of some abstract 
equivalent thereof). Such treatments address the concerns of mathemati-
cians and are of great power in applications. Their popularity among 
philosophers has been sustained further by remnants of older corpulari-
stic ideas to the effect that atomistic physics (or some similar deep-level 
theory) enjoys a privileged status over against mere perceptual experi-
ence. Our contention here, in contrast, is that an alternative, formally 
coherent and at the same time more realistic theory of the continuum can 
be arrived at via the top-down approach. - The formal details are set out 
in Smith {1995) & (1997). 
Of course, nothing precludes the possibility of constructing models of 
even a non-Dedekindian theory in set-theoretic terms. That the set-the-
oretic framework can yield at best a model (or family of models) of the 
continuum, however, and not a theory of the continuum itself as this is 
given in our experience of spatial bodies, is something which must be 
insisted upon for at least the following reasons: 
1. The latter is a qualitative continuum not merely in the sense that it 
is (standardly) filled by qualities (of colour, temperature, etc.) but also in 
the sense that it does not sustain the sorts of cardinal number construc-
tions (with the associated talk of 'continuum many', etc.) imposed by the 
set-theoretic approach. The experienced continuum is not isomorphic to 
any real-number structure, since the standard mathematical opposition 
between a dense and a continuous series here finds no application. Noth-
ing like Cantor's continuum problem arises for the experienced continu-
um, and indeed the very existence of this problem - pointing to a stark 
absence of relevant intuitions which would decide the issue - may testify 
to the greater realism of our alternative theory. 
2. The set-theoretical construction of the continuum is predicated on 
the highly questionable thesis that out of unextended building blocks an 
extended whole can somehow be constructed. The experienced continu-
um, in contrast, is organized not in such a way that it would be built up 
out of particles or atoms, but rather in such a way that the wholes, includ-
ing the medium of space, come before the parts which these wholes might 
contain and which might be distinguished on various levels within them. 
The existence of boundaries presupposes as a matter of necessity the 
existence of continua which they are the boundaries of. 
3. The application of set theory to a subject-matter requires the isola-
tion of some basic level of Urelemente in such a way as to make possible 
a simulation of the structures appearing on higher levels by means of sets 
of successively higher types. If, however, as holds in the case of investi-
gations of the ontology of the experienced world, we are dealing with 
mesoscopic entities and with their mesoscopic constituents {the latter the 
products of more or less arbitrary real or imagined division along a vari-
ety of distinct axes), then there are no Urelemente to serve as our starting-
point. Moreover, it seems that we cannot even in principle rely upon 
physics to supply us with Urelemente of the appropriate sort, since even 
if ultimate physical particles were capable of being isolated, these would 
not in themselves constitute a continuum but rather would presuppose the 
continuum of space-time within which they would be located. 
4. Set theory sees the continuum as homogeneous, as made up of only 
one sort of ultimate part (points, atoms, real numbers). From our per-
spective, in contrast, the continuum is made up of parts of a variety of 
different sorts: boundaries of different numbers of dimensions, on the 
one hand, and the extended bodies and regions of space which these 
boundaries are the boundaries of, on the other. It is this feature of bound-
aries - that they are as a matter of necessity parts of heterogeneous larger 
wholes which they bound - which distinguishes our present conception 
of a boundary most radically from standard mathematical conceptions. 
The contrast is illustrated by Brentano as follows. We are asked to imag-
ine that space 
would contain at one and the same time a collection of spheres, each 
moving with a different velocity. For one sphere this would be 0, 
for another 1 mile per hour, for a third 1/2 a mile per hour, and so 
on, so that there would be represented by some sphere every inter-
mediate velocity between 0 and 1 mile per hour that is conceivable, 
whether it manifests a rational or an irrational ratio. If one asks 
whether one would then have to do with a continuum of velocities, 
then this question would, according to Dedekind, have to be an-
swered in the affirmative. In truth however it would have to be 
denied. Where an actual continuum of velocities would be present 
is in the case of a disc rotating in such a way that the velocity at the 
circumference is 1 mile per hour while the centre did not change its 
place. The difference between the two cases is this: in the latter, each 
of the velocities appears as a boundary which taken in itself is noth-
ing, but when unified with the continuum of velocities is such as to 
make a contribution thereto; in the case of the collection of spheres, 
in contrast, the velocity of each sphere is something for itself; it is 
just this which stands in contradiction with its forming a true con-
tinuum with the remaining velocities. (Brentano (1988), 41; my 
underlining) 
5. Standard mathematical treatments of the continuum impose a principle 
of duality according to which every boundary of an entity is also a 
boundary of the complement of that entity. It is this principle, above all, 
which is responsible for the Zeno-type problems with which we began. 
Intuitively, however, it seems that the boundaries given in experience are 
in many cases asymmetrical. This applies, for example, to the external 
boundaries of bodies and to the beginnings and endings of processes 
extended in time. Thus it seems not to be the case that the external bound-
ary of a substance is in the same sense a boundary of that entity which is 
the result of subtracting this substance from the universe as a whole (and 
even the thesis that there is such an entity is something which from our 
present perspective has to be taken with a pinch of salt). 
Zeno's Paradox for Countries 
It might be argued that the account of spatial boundaries presented above 
is of phenomenological interest at best, and gains no purchase as far as 
actual reality is concerned, since spatial boundaries of the sorts discussed 
- which enjoy a sort of geometrical perfection - are not at home in the 
world of unkempt nature that is described by physics. There is at least 
one domain, however, where we can find examples of boundaries in spa-
tial reality to which our theory directly applies. 
A boundary, for Brentano, bounds only its associated continuum. It is 
not also, in the same strict sense, a boundary of its surroundings. It is as 
if the external boundaries of a continuous thing point only inwards. 
Compare, in this respect, the boundary between the old German Demo-
cratic and Federal Republics with the boundary between, for example, 
Germany and France. The latter is a boundary facing in two directions, 
or more precisely it is a pair of boundaries facing in opposite directions 
which are coincident for a certain stretch of their respective total exten-
sions. The former, in contrast, for as long as it existed, was a boundary in 
one direction only: it faced inwards, to the East, since the Federal Repub-
lic did not recognize a boundary in that location at all. 
All political and legal boundaries must, it seems, enjoy the sort of 
geometrical perfection that was presupposed above. Thus they must be 
infinitely thin (must take up no space), for otherwise disputes would 
constantly arise in relation to the no-mans-land which the boundaries 
themselves would then occupy. If a wall or river separates two distinct 
portions of land, then either the wall or the river must be split equally 
down the middle, or it must be assigned as a whole to one or other of the 
two parties, or it must be declared common property (and then there will 
exist two infinitely thin boundaries separating each of the two distinct 
parcels of land from the commonly owned region which divides them). 
Note, too, that, as is shown by the case of the United States or of New 
Zealand, boundaries (like the things they bound) can be scattered; they 
can be built up mereologically out of separate and disconnected Irish-
style bits. (See Cartwright (1975) and Smith (1995a)) And as the case of 
New York State and the U.S.A. makes clear, distinct geopolitical bound-
aries may also coincide from within. That is, they may coincide for a part 
of their length along which they serve as boundaries on the same side. 
Note, finally, that even though (from the perspective here advanced) 
political boundaries exist as full-fledged denizens of reality, and even 
though such boundaries exist always as parts of the things they bound, 
here, too, coincidence falls short of identity. Thus France and Germany 
share no common parts. The border of France is, after all, French. 
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